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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the thesis  is to find if there is evidence of the directional effect 
of a short-term overreaction hypothesis in the Finnish stock market. If the effect 
is found, it is assumed to disappear in a study window of five days as 
implication of the market efficiency. 
 
Data consist of returns of stocks traded in the Large Cap and Mid Cap lists of 
Helsinki Stock Exchange OMX during years 2002 – 2007. The method is to 
separate the stocks, with daily return of a ±10 % or over to porfolios of winners 
and losers and study the price reactions in the first day and in the days 2, 3, 4 
and 5 after the initial return of ±10 % or over.  
 
The result of the study is, that there is a difference in the behavior of a prior 
winner portfolio in contrast to a prior loser portfolio: a prior losers become 
winners in the first day after the initial return and vice versa. This is similar 
with the overreaction hypothesis. The average return of a day 1 after the -10 % 
or more return is 1,2 %. The average return of a day 1 after the +10 % return is -    
0,5 %. The difference is 1,7 %. Approximately the same difference is found 
between the losers and winners  if the data is smoothed by rejecting 10 pieces of 
the most extreme findings of both portfolios. During the days 2, 3 ,4 and 5 there 
cannot be seen a pattern like this in the returns of either loser of winner 
portfolios. That´s why there  cannot be formed a trading strategy based on the 
results of the study. 
 
KEYWORDS: Stock market overreaction, market efficiency, price reversals.  
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1.INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The capital market is a title given to the market where long-term finance is 
raised by firms and by local and national governments. The new finance market 
is called the primary capital market, where the securities are sold for the first 
time and the secondary market, where securities are traded by market 
participants, financial intermediaries and individual investors. The attempt to 
control the fluctuation of the market and receiving benefit of it has been the 
interest of participants since the beginning of the activity.  
   
 “What goes up must come down 
Spinning wheel, got to go around 
Talking ´bout your troubles, it´s cryig sin 
Ride a painted pony, let the spinning wheel spin!” 
Spinning Wheel 
 
David Clayton-Thomas (1969) 
 
One may think that the scene described in the lyrics above could be a 
methaphora for the fluctuation in the stock market and implication to a 
contrarian investment strategy. Contrarian investment strategy emphasizes 
investing in stocks, that haven´t had a good level of performance in the past,  in 
belief,  that they are will perform better in the future. 
 
Some laws of nature propose, as well, that there is eternal reversion going on in 
certain procedures: sun rises in the mornings and sets in the evenings. In the 
behavior of  tide high and low alter in the shores from day to day, week to 
week, from now to eternity. 
 
On the other hand, some confirmation for the opposite pattern, momemtum 
strategy,  is presented in the First Law of dynamics (Galileo-Newton´s inertia 
principle) by Isaac Newton (1642 – 1727): “If a body is moving without external 
forces, then it maintains indefinitely its rectilinear and uniform motion with a 
constant speed, or, if it is initially at rest, it continues to be at rest.”  Momemtum 
strategy proposes investing in stocks, which have had good a prior 
performance and will thus continue to have a positive returns in the future. 
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Which one to chose? There are clear prerequisites for both momentum and  
contrarian actions in the stock market if paradigms of the profound theories, 
truths and cultural heritage of mankind are applied in the theory of finance. 
 
When investigating the capital market and the macroeconomic issues, John 
Maynard Keynes, an famous economist, found in 1936 that there is too much 
fluctuation in the secondary market. Maurice Kendall, finance researcher,  
published “The Analysis of Economic Time Series” in 1953 where he discovered 
that the prices of stocks and commodities seemed to follow random walk. 
Random walk means that the price changes are independent of oneother and 
thus not predictable. Eugene Fama introduced the concept of efficient market in 
1965. At the efficient stock markets the best estimation of the correct price of a 
stock is its market price. Even if there may exist some fluctuation at the market, 
effective market hypothesis states that  
  
A perfectly efficient market is one in which every security´s 
price equals its investment value at all times. 
 
In an efficient capital market a security´s price will be a good estimate of its 
investments value meaning that the present value of its future prospects as 
estimated by well-informed and skilful analysts. Still there are types of 
fluctuation that exceed regular price movements: irregularities, also called 
anomalies. The best recognised anomalies are day of the week -effect, turn of 
the month -effect, January-effect and size -effect. Stock prices tend to underreact 
to news over short time horizons and continue to move in the same direction 
over some period of time , for example  dividend announcements. 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
There are several anomalies in the stock market, which present direct 
challenges to the efficient market hypothesis. Some anomalous empirical 
evidence are, for instance,  time -specific, such as the day of the week -effect, 
intra-day, intra-month and January -effects. Others are more company -specific: 
P/E -ratio, firm size -effect, and beta -effects are few examples. Most of the 
anomalies mentioned above can be traced back to the 1950´es and 1960´es and 
are still under thorough investigations by both academics and practioners, even 
if anomalies seem to dilute or disappear when discovered. Is there for example 
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a January -effect in the Finnish stock market nowadays? In a couple of last 
years, the answer is no.  
 
The overreaction hypothesis states that investors are inclined to digest 
information irrationally and have a disposition of placing too much weight on 
more current events. In other words, investors ordinarily interpret new 
information, be it available or unavailable, in a systematically biased manner. 
They tend to be either over-optimistic or over-pessimistic, with no room in 
between. Under such a scenario, equity prices are not equitably determined by 
the “true” forces of the time, especially when new information or extreme 
events arrive. Although stock prices would go abnormally high (low) due to 
investors´ overreaction in the initial period, they have a tendency to adjust 
themselves back to the equilibrium level in the subsequent period. In essence, 
the stock price movement enjoys a systematic pattern and can be predicted 
beforehand under the assumption of the overreaction hypothesis. If that is the 
case, smart investors can exploit this opportunity of predictable reversal by 
implementing some sort of contrarian trading strategies for speculating or 
hedging.  
 
The first empirical evidence supporting the overreaction hypothesis and 
document in the literature is by Rosenborg and Rudd (1982). DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987) provided the confirmation of a price reversal over a three-
year return interval are, however, the most prominent and influential in 
stimulating the ongoing research. A true/false conclusion reached in the 
overreaction hypothesis is, nevertheless relevant to time frame of the return 
interval adopted, risk stationary, firm size and seasonality. Furthermore, many 
researchers have reached results about the overreaction hypothesis in both 
developed and emerging markets due totally to the factors examined in the 
study process. That´s why the usefulness of contrarian strategies, which are 
built upon the overreaction hypothesis has to be investigated.  
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1.2 The purpose of the thesis 
 
 
The purpose of the study is to examine  if there exists the directional effect of 
the short-term overreaction hypothesis in the Finnish stock marketthe market 
efficiency holds in case of short-term overreaction hypothesis and if the possible 
finding can implicate some patterns in stock returns. If a clear shaped pattern is 
found, the concern is, if one could form a trading strategy based on the pattern. 
 
Study question of this thesis is: Is there a directional and/or intensity effect of 
the overreaction hypothesis in the Finnish stock market? Does the efficient 
market hypothesis hold in the Finnish stock market? Can there be trading 
strategy adapted of the behavior of prices in case of overreaction? 
 
Hypotheses of this study are: 
 
H1: There exists the price reversal as implication of directional effect of  
overreaction hypothesis in case of extreme price movements in the Finnish 
stock market.  
 
H2: The overreaction exists,  but it is corrected by market in subsuquent days as 
implication of market efficiency hypothesis 
 
H3: There can be formed a reasonable trading patterns based on the behavior of 
stock: daily returns, special day or month. 
 
The foundation of the first hypothesis is the assumption that historical data of 
the price returns of stocks can be used to predict returns. The subject is 
controversial among academics and practioners of financial market. Some think 
rather than the prices are independent and are based on the fundamental value 
of a company. Supporters of the idea claim that methods of technical analyses 
of stock market refer to the future. The hypothesis two believes in a market 
efficiency, but the hypothesis three proposes, that the market efficiency can be 
broken.  
 
I propose that there exists the directional effect of a overreaction hypothesis in 
Finnish stock market, but that it is corrected in a near future and the efficient 
market hypothesis holds. The magnitude effect and the intensity effect, the two 
study questions of a Brown and Harlow(1988) are not analysed in this study: 
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nowadays there are only few initial reactions which have magnitude over 20 % 
or 30 % in stock returns and the intensity effect is should be analysed rather of 
intra-day data than of closing prices. Since the issue of the overreaction 
hypothesis has not yet been completely settled down in markets, this study tries 
to obtain a more clear picture by inspecting the extent to which investors have 
actually overreacted in setting prices in the OMHEX (Helsinki Stock Exchange) 
over the past decade. 
 
 
1.3. Outline of the study 
 
Thesis is organized as follows: the concept of market efficiency is discussed in 
the next chapter. Anomalies, irregular violations against the market efficiency 
are presented thereafter. There is also a quick view to the security pricing 
methods. The third chapter presents the  behavioral finance, the relevance to the 
subject comes from the inexlicable fluctuations of prices in the stock market. 
The overreaction literature is presented in chapter four where there is also the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange presented. Fifth chapter is the empirical part of the 
thesis, which outlines methodology and empirical findings of the study. 
Conclusions are expressed in the chapter six.  
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2. MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
 
The concept of efficient market was discovered by chance as a by-product. 
Statistician Maurice Kendall (1953) had been studying the behavior of stock and 
commodity prices and looking for regular price cycles, but could not find them. 
Instead he discovered that prices seemed to follow “random walk”, where one 
day´s price change could not be predicted by looking at the previous day´s 
price change.  The random walk -theory states that stock and commodity price 
movements will not follow any patterns or trends and that past price 
movements cannot be used to predict future price movements. There is no 
systematic correlation between one movement and the subsuquent ones 
(Brealey and Myers 1996). A reason for random walk is that the share price 
reflects all available information at any one time and it will only change if new 
information arises. Successive price changes will be independent and prices 
follow random walk because the next information or news will be independent 
of the last piece of news. There is no quarantee whether the news will be good 
or bad (Arnold 1998). Term random walk can be misleading if it is thought that 
the price of a share moves at random, without any reason. If so, market would 
be inefficient because share prices would change without any good reason 
(Jones and Lumby 1999).     
   
The concept of efficient market was developed in 1965  by finance researcher 
Eugene Fama. It states that 
 
"An efficient market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of 
rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future 
market values of individual securities, and where important current information 
is almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient market, competition 
among the many intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point 
in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of 
information based both on events that have already occurred and on events 
which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, 
in an efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a 
good estimate of its intrinsic value."  
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These highly controversial and disputed theories are foundation how the stock 
market fluctuations are studied nowadays and especielly the theory of efficient 
market has been met with a lot of critics by both researchers and practioners. 
Above all,  technical analysts have had opponent view for the issue. Their 
argument against the efficient market theory is that many investors base their 
expectations on past prices, past earnings, track records and other indicators. 
Because the stock prices are largely based on investor expectations, many of 
them think that it only makes sense to believe that past prices influence on 
future prices.  Supporters of the efficient market hypothesis believe that it is 
useless to search for undervalued stocks or try to predict forthcoming trends in 
the stock market through technical of fundamental analysis. 
 
The efficient market hypothesis doesn´t imply perfect forecasting ability. It is 
thought that if orices go up and down, and it´s a sign of a violations against the 
representativiness of the theory. But, the violation would be,  if the prices 
wouldn´t act that way. As well, it is error to think that the random behavior of 
stock prices implies that the stock market is irrational as a whole. Irrationality 
and randomness are not synonymes, rather vice versa: stock prices are random 
because investors are rational and competive (Brealey and Myers 1988).  
  
Knüpfer and Puttonen (2004) defend the efficient market hypothesis as most 
misunderstood theory of finance. They claim that prices of stocks can differ 
remarkably from their intrinsic value, effectivity assumes only that the 
differation is corrected eventually. Half of the investors win the market and half 
of the investors lose to market, but this is random. All operators are not 
rational, but that does not mean, that the market as a whole would not be that. 
Even if there exists anomalies, irregularities in stock markets, efficent market is 
a self-correcting mechanism, where there may occur inefficiencies, but they are 
corrected after investors discover them and exploit them. 
 
Arnold (1998) concludes the importance of the market efficiency for three 
reasons. It encourages individual investors to invest in private enterprise. If 
there is no correct pricing, many savers will refuse to invest because of a fear 
that when they sell, the price would not represent the fundamental value of 
attractions of the firm. It gives correct signals to company managers in 
implementing the shareholder wealth-enhancing decisions. It helps allocate 
resources by both operating and pricing efficiency. If stock market is not pricing 
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the share of a poorly run company in a declining industry correctly, the 
company will be able to issue new shares and thus attract society´s savings 
instead of better options. 
 
Critics agains efficient market hypothesis has been stated by practionaires: any 
portfolio will perform as well or better as a special trading strategy when there 
is a rising prices and  there should be fewer fluctuations if the markets are 
efficient. Traders are mostly passive and only a minority of investors have a 
information enough for the active trading. The defence of efficient market 
hypothesis for these comments are, that systematic risk is greater for a “any 
portfolio”, prices fluctuate because of the new information announcement by 
companies and information of active, sophisticated traders spreads fast in 
public by their buying and selling actions forming a semi-strong form of 
efficiency (Arnold 1998). 
 
Fama (1998) defended the idea against critics. He stated that the standard 
scientific rule orders that the concept of market efficiency can only be replaced 
by a better. The alternative has a daunting task: it must specify what it is about 
investor psychology that causes simultaneous underreaction to some types of 
events and overreaction to others. And the alternative must present well-
defined hypotheses, themselves potentially rejectable by empirical tests. 
 
2.1 Perfect capital markets  
 
To contrast to the efficient markets, the perfect market has some special 
definitions. Stock markets are perfect if the following conditions are fulfilled 
(Copeland and Weston 1988):  
 
 Markets are frictionless. That is there are no transaction costs or taxes, all 
assets are perfectly divisible and marketable, and there are no 
constraining regulations. 
 
 There is perfect competition in product and securities markets. In 
products market this means that all producers supply goods and services 
at minimum average cost and in securities markets it means that all 
participants are price takers. 
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 Markets are informationally efficient: i.e. information is costless and it is 
received simultaneously by all individuals. 
 
 All individuals are rational expected utility maximizers. 
 
Given these conditions both product and securities markets will be 
operationally, allocationally  and informationally efficient. Assumption for the 
operational efficiency is that intermediaries, who provide service of channeling 
funds from savers to investors do so at the minimum cost that provides them a 
fair return for their services.  In allocationally effective market prices are 
determined in a way that equates risk-adjusted marginal rates of return for all 
producers and savers and there the process of allocating societies scarce 
resources between competin real investements is effective. Efficiency in 
information means that it is not only received simultaneously by all 
counterparts but also received in a symmectric form. Informational efficiency is 
prerequisite for allocational efficiency and thus cornerstone of the theory. 
 
Sharpe (1985) states that opposite of perfect capital markets is crazy capital 
market. New information is a surprise, because if it is not, it is predicted by the 
market. Since happy surprises are about as likely as unahappy, prices behave 
similarly in an efficient market. While security´s price is unpredictable in such a 
market, in perfectly efficient market price changes would be more or less 
random. Market may not be perfectly efficient, but closer to that than craziness. 
Well organized market places, like New York Stock Exchange in the USA is 
considered to constitute a efficient market in a practical level (Ross et al 1995).  
 
2.2  Three forms of efficiency 
 
According to Fama (1970), there are three forms of market efficiency: 
 
1) Weak-form efficiency means that the unanticipated return is not 
correlated with the previous unanticipated returns i.e. the market has no 
memory and the current prices reflect all information contained in the 
past prices.  
2) Semi-strong market efficiency means that the unanticipated return is not 
correlated with any publicly available information i.e. prices reflect not 
only past but all other published information. Finally,  
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3) Strong-form efficiency means that unanticipated return is not correlated 
with any information i.e. price reflect all existing information, be it 
publicly available or insider. This would mean, that prices would always 
be fair and no investor would be able to consistently superior forecasts of 
stock prices (Brealey & Myers 1988).    
 
FORM OF EFFICIENCY INFORMATION REFLECTED IN PRICES 
  
Weak Previous prices of security 
Semi-strong Publicly available information 
Strong All information, both public and private 
Table 1. The forms of efficiency (Alexander &Sharpe 1989)  
 
The efficiency of the markets has been tested in several empircal tests. These 
tests have found efficiencies of different levels in stock exchanges of the world. 
 
 
2.3. Testing the market efficiency  
 
The joint-hypothesis problem causes that market efficiency isn´t testable 
intrisically. It must be tested jointly with a model for expected, normal returns. 
This means that a model of equilibrium, an asset-pricing model, must be used 
jointly to test whether information is properly reflected in prices. If 
irregularities on the behavior of returns are found, it is difficult to classify 
whether the reason for this is  market inefficiency or a bad model equilibrium 
(Fama 1991). The bad model problem is less serious in short return windows 
event studies, studies which last for few days, and where daily expected returns 
are close to zero and more serious in long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns, 
which compound an expected-return model´s problems in explaining short-
term returns (Fama 1998).  
 
The identification of inefficiencies in the stock market may provide opportunity 
for financial gains and thus the counterparts of market test the inefficiency 
constantly at empirical level. When inefficiency is found, it is possible that it can 
be exploited for a while to get profit at the market. The tests of weak form 
efficiency have found that market is efficient in the weak sense, but the 
evidence on semi-strong form efficiency is more mixed. Testing procedure, 
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joint-hypothesis problem causes difficulties in finding the proof on the case. 
Still the majority of the studies conclude that most stock markets fulfill the 
requirements of weak and  semi-strong efficiency  at least most of the time. In 
the strong form efficiency the market would reflects all the information, 
published and unpublished in the prices of stocks the information and there is 
some evidence on the strong form of efficiency as well  (Jones and Lumby 1999).  
 
2.3.1. Tests for weak-form efficiency 
 
The weak-form tests of efficient market hypothesis are implemented with the 
forecasts of historical stock price data of past returns. The results of the 
predictability of short-term returns are mixed. In the 1960´es and early 1970´es 
the continuous expected returns hypothesis was normally accepted and even 
there were some evidence that returns were predictable the tests had no 
statistical evidence (Fama 1991). Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Conrad and Kaul 
(1988) were able to show that, due to variance reduction obtained through 
diversification, portfolios produce stronger indications of time variation in 
weekly expected returns than individual stocks. However, this is at least partly 
due to non-syncronous trading effects, especially for small stocks. French and 
Roll (1986) found out that stock prices are more variable when the market is 
open, is is that variance is higher during trading hours than during non-trading 
hours. A explanation for this is the transitory component in price changes that 
induced by the noise trading of uninformed investors. More recent studies were 
able to show that daily and weekly returns are predictable from past returns 
and the constant expected returns hypothesis was rejected.  
 
In studies of the long-term return predictability, the literature doesn´t interpret 
the autocorrelation in daily and weekly returns as important evidence against 
the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and constant expected returns. The 
support for that is, even when the autocorrelation deviate reliably from zero 
they are close to zero and thus economically insignificant. For contradiction, 
Summers (1986) presented models in which stock prices act according to large 
slowly decaying movements away from the  fundamental values. These models 
tell that the market is highly inefficient, but so that it is missed in tests on short-
term returns. The evidence is clear, but the tests showed only weak statistical 
significance. Fama and French (1988) found that the autocorrelations of returns 
on diversified portfolios of NYSE stocks had the pattern predicted by Summers, 
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but the tests on long-term returns got from small sample sizes and low power. 
So, there is merely a weak statistical evidence against the hypothesis that 
returns have no autocorrelation and prices act as random walk,  similar 
findings there was in the study of Poterba and Summers (1988). 
 
Return predictability also includes the work on forecasting with variables like 
for example dividend yields and earnings/price ratios. There exists many 
anomalies like earnings- and size-related regularities and stock market 
seasonalities.  
 
2.3.2. Tests for semi-strong trong form efficiency 
 
Tests for semi-strong form of efficiency focuses on the question of usefulness of 
acquiring and analysing publicly available information. Semi-strong efficiency 
interests the researchers and practioners most of the forms efficient market 
hypothesis. If market is efficient in a semi-strong way, it undermines the work 
of fundamental analysts whose trading rules can not be applied to produce 
abnormal returs because all publicly available information is already reflected 
in the stock price (Arnold 1998). Studies of the semi-strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis can be categorized as tests of the speed of adjustment of 
prices to new information. The principal research tool in this area is the event 
study. Using simple tools, this research documents interesting regularities in 
the response of stock prices to investment decisions, financing decisions and 
changes in corporate control. Usually daily data is used in event studies, 
because it offers advantages compared to longer-interval data. When the 
announcement of an event can be dated to a particular day, daily data allows 
precise measurements of the speed of the stock-price response – the central 
issue for market efficiency. Another powerful advantage of using daily data is 
that the joint-hypothesis problem can be eliminated (Fama 1991). 
 
The typical result in event studies on daily data is that, on average, stock prices 
seem to adjust within a day to event announcements. Therefore, it can be said 
that the adjustment of stock prices to new information is efficient. On the other 
hand, since event studies focus on the average adjustment of prices to 
information, they do not tell how much of the residual variance, generated by 
the deviations from average, is rational. So, the efficiency issues are never 
entirely solved. Some event studies suggest that stock prices do not respond 
 21 
quickly to specific information. However, the main point is that event studies 
are the cleanest evidence on efficiency and with few exceptions, the evidence is 
supportive (Fama 1991) 
 
 
2.3.3 Tests for strong-form efficiency 
 
There are likely some positive information and trading costs, so the extreme 
version of the market efficiency hypothesis is false. It assumes that there are no 
costs of information or cost of trading at the market (Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980). A weaker assumptions for the hypothesis there are in Jensen´s (1978) 
study which found out that prices reflect information to the point where the 
marginal benefits of acting on information doesn´t overrate the marginal costs. 
If an efficient market is defined so that there are no risk-free returns above the 
opportunity cost available to agents given transaction costs and agents´ 
information, there is no contradiction between efficient market hypothesis and 
cointegration (Dwyer and Wallace 1992). Despite being economically more 
sensible, this approach suffers from the difficulty of deciding what are 
reasonable information and trading costs. Ambiguity about information and 
trading costs are not, however, the main obstacles to inferences about market 
efficiency. Early identification of new information can provide substantial 
profits. Insiders who trade on the basis of priviledged information can therefore 
make excess returns, violation the strong form of the efficient market 
hypothesis. For insiders the stock market is not efficient, they have information 
that is not reflected in prices.  
 
The evidence shows, that because information has costs, some informed 
investors, like professionals of financial analysing, benefit  for the costs they use 
in their effort to ensure that prices adjust to information. The market is then less 
than fully efficient, there can be private information not fully reflected in prices, 
but in a way that is consistent with rational behavior by all investors (Fama 
1991). This is in line with the noisy rational expectations model of competitive 
equilibrium must leave some profit for professional analysts. After all, the 
concept of market efficiency has to adapt the possibility of  inefficiencies in a 
small scale. Stock market cannot be efficient in the completely strong form. Still, 
wide exploitation of a private information is rare, even if some critics is 
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presented agains the actions of professional mutual-fund managers and 
security analysts, and advisors of the financial intermediaries.  
 
 
2.4. Analysing the stock market 
 
Majority of the  active stock market investors try to beat the market. They 
attempt to identify under-valued shares and buy them before their price rises: 
similarly, they look for over-valued shares in order to sell them before their 
prices fall. In other words, such investors are backing their own judgement 
about what the shares are worth, against the collective judgement of the stock 
market as seen in the current price of the shares. Therefore they act as though 
the market were inefficient. 
 
There are basically three or four forms of stock market analysis that investors 
use to help them try and identify over- and under-valued sare and these are 
linked to the levels of efficiency we have discussed. Traditional stock market 
analysis methods that are used to valuate prices of securities,  analyses that 
investors use to identify over- and undervalued shares. They are fundamental 
analysis and technical analysis. Fundamental analysis investigates the reasons 
and technical analysis the effects of changes in stock valuation. Two discussed 
metods of stock market analysis are  the use of insider information and  analysis  
of investor sentiment as a concept of behavioral finance (Shefrin 2000). 
 
Supporters of fundamental analysis claim, that technical analysis is against 
efficient market hypothesis: if relevant information is used in pricing the 
securities, they follow random walk and historical data doesn´t help to see to 
the future. Another often argued fact about  technical analysis  is that it is a 
method, which fulfills its own predictions. When practioners of stock market 
use tools of technical analysis similarly and get the same signals, buy or sell,  
the prices behave accordingly. The similar interpretation of market information, 
however, doesn´t occur either in technical analysis or fundamental analysis. 
Fundamental analyses may differ from eachothers (Luoma 1990).      
 
The ratio between supply and demand makes the price of goods in the market. 
The “right price” of a security is formed in stock exchanges by market 
counterparts who establish the supply and demand for securities.  
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2.4.1 Fundamental analysis 
 
Fundamental analysts study the fundamental factors that lie behind a stock or 
commodity value. These are company´s sales, earnings, growht potential, 
assets, debt, management, products and competition. Competition in 
fundamental research will tend to ensure that prices reflect all relevant 
information and that price changes are unpredictable. The other analysts study 
the past price record of stocks and look for cycles. These analysts are called 
technical analysts. Competition in technical research will tend to ensure that 
current prices reflect all information in the past sequence of prices and that 
future price changes cannot be predicted from past prices (Brealey and Myers 
1996). Investors are flooded with variety of information on macroeconomic 
indexes, policymakers´ statements and political news. Future growth rate, 
inflation rate and interest rate affect on investor´s expectations of stock market 
prices  (Veronesi 2000).  
 
Even if accounting policies have changed to more open and reliable there 
remains a question about the possible manipulation of companies 
announcements, for example balance sheets or income statements. A stock´s 
historical price data is absolute and can not be manipulated. This gives more 
weight on technical analysis (Carlson 2007). 
 
Traditional asset-pricing models were invented in 1960´es and 1970´es to 
predict asset returns. The most important of the models is Capital asset pricing 
model CAPM. It is  theory, which has dominated the academic literature ever 
since and influenced greatly the practical world of finance and business for over 
four decades. It was developed by William Sharpe and John Lintner in mid 
1960´es. CAPM is essentially reduction of the Portfolio theory by Harry 
Markowitz from 1952. Other famous asset-pricing models are APT, arbitrage 
pricing theory by Stephen Ross  and Robert Merton´s intertemporal capital asset 
pricing model  ICAPM  (Martikainen 1998).   
 
A central objective of CAPM is used as a model for the pricing of risky assets. It 
describes the relationship between risk and expected return. The CAPM model 
provides a means with which the future cash flows of an asset can be 
discounted. The riskier the asset, the lower the present value of its future cash 
flows. 
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A central principle of the CAPM is that systematic risk which is measured by 
beta, is the only factor influencing on the level of return required on a share for 
a fully diversified investor. For practical use this risk factor is considered to be 
the extent to which  a particular share´s returns move when the stock market as 
a whole moves. What is more, the relationship between this beta factor and 
returns is described by a straight line, if is linear. This compact and complete 
model changed the way people see the  financial market  and affected their 
actions. 
 
According to CAPM there are different expected rates of returns for various 
investments only because their beta coefficient is different. Instead of a matrix 
of covariances between all securities in the market, there is only one covariance 
coefficient: beta, the covariance between a security and the market. Several 
models are presented for security pricing. For example, Arbitrage pricing 
theory, APT,  which divides the beta-coefficient of the CAPM-model for set of 
components is more difficult to exploit in practice. (Martikainen 1998)   
 
The CAPM formula by Sharpe is:  
 
(1) E(ri) = rf + βi(E(rm)- rf  
 
Where:  
 
E(ri) is the expected return on asset I 
 
βi is the Beta of asset i 
 
E(rm) is the expected market rate of return and  
 
rf  is the risk-free rate of interest 
 
 
A security's Beta measures the amount of movement expected in the security's 
price for a given movement in the market in general. For instance, if a security 
has a Beta of 1.2, it is expect to move up 1.2% for every 1% upward move in the 
market; and move down 1.2% for every 1% downward move in the market  
(Ross et al. 1995). 
 
Hong and Stein (1999) state that it is becoming increasingly clear that traditional 
asset-pricing models as capital pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe and arbitrage 
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pricing theory (APT) of Lintner and Ross or Merton´s intertemporal capital 
asset pricing model (ICAPM) are becoming less accurate in explaining the 
growing set of facts affecting on the capital market. Fama´s more recent (1998) 
point of view is that an efficient market is not an old-fashioned hypothesis. He 
states that in an efficient market, apparent under reaction will be about as 
frequent as overreaction to information: if anomalies split randomly between 
these two cases, market efficiency holds. Fama also states that the long-term 
return anomalies are sensitive to methodology and they tend to become 
marginal or disappear when exposed to different models for expected (normal) 
returns or when different statistical approaches are used to measure them. 
 
 
Another basic model to value the price of a stock is Gordon´s model:  
 
                                        
             D1     
(2)   P0    =   R-G 
    
 
where  D1 is the (assumed) dividend company is paying next year 
 R is the required return  
 G is the growht of dividends (G < R)  
 
Assumptions for using the Gordon´s model is that the first dividend paying 
occurs one year from now and they occur year after year steadily at the same 
time (Vaihekoski 2002).  Dividend should be solid or it should grow in a known 
manner.  
 
 
2.4.2 Technical Analysis 
 
Technical analysis is a method where statistical and graphical market 
information are used for the purpose of forecasting future prices. In a narrow 
sense technical analysis means analysing price and volume of change in a stock 
market. In a broader sense technical analysis considers analysis of stock and 
commodity market structure and above all its reactions to market information. 
Fundamental and technical analysis are to complete eachothers: fundamental 
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analysis helps investor by pointing out the competent securities and technical 
analysis helps in right timing of buying selected securities (Luoma 1990).  
 
A technical analyst is not interested in estimating the intrinsic value of stock 
and doesn´t use fundamental information, such as the profit figures or  
macroeconomic conditions to analyse stock prices. Instead he believes that a 
chart of price and data of trading volume is all that is needed to forecast future 
price movements (Arnold 1998). Theory of random walk challenges the 
technical analysts to think, if share price follow random walk, technical analysis 
is worthless because it cannot have any predictive power: anything which 
moves at random cannot be predicted (Jones and Lumby 1999). Technical 
analysis is a controversial method in finance. Some professionals think that 
technical analysis can provide valuable information change in stock market 
valuation and some think it is useless for that purpose. However, technical 
analysts make stock market more efficient by securing prices (Martikainen 
1998).    
 
In predicting prices, psychological support and resistance ranges are important 
to realize. Support range means area of congestion or previous lows below the 
current price mark support levels. Resistance range means area of congestion 
and previous highs above the current price mark the resistance levels. Support 
range occurs, when there a so many buyers in the market, that bear market 
stops. Resistance range occurs, when there are so many sellers in the market, 
that bull market stops. Support and resistance ranges are to stop upward and 
dowhward slopes of stockmarket. These ranges are posted by psychological 
factors of investors´ and when ranges are broken, it takes time before new 
ranges are posted in new positions: there are no solid points of contagion in 
new price range (Kallunki et al 2002).  
 
Charles Dow developed in the beginning of the 20th century theory of trends in 
stock market. In Dow-theory stock prices move in three different trends. The 
first and most important is a primary trend which refers to the long-term move 
in share prices. The secondary of the intermediate trend runs for weeks or 
months before being reversed by another intermediate trend in the other 
direction. Tertiary trends, which last for a few days, are less important. 
Supporters of Dow-theory tried to recognise the main trend in the stock market 
from the usual market fluctuation by investors. The swing in a primary trend 
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shows the time to buy or sell stocks. The swing can be seen by change in 
secondary trend (Martikainen 1998).  
 
Stock market volume and price changes are the basis for the technical analysts, 
who believe they can find trends which repeat in patterns.  There is a variety of 
techniques used in technical analysis which concentrate on different 
components of historical data of stock market pricing. Kallunki et al (2002) 
present a few of these even if new techniques are developed all the time: 
 
a) A japanese candlesticks charting was developed in 17th century in Japan for 
trading analysis of rice. It is easy technique to interpret and a flexible and clear 
method of technical analysis, where especielly the relationship between 
opening and closing, high and low prices are shown in the chart. A japanese 
candlestick charting techniques can be used independently of other technical 
tools. 
 
b) Point & figure – method was invented in 20th century in USA.  In the typical 
use of the  method stock closing price or high and low price  movements are 
plotted in the price chart where the potential changes are studied. Point & 
figure –method closes the noise behavior of market and concentrates on the 
main direction of price trend. The method is usually more suitable for long-
term analysing, but can be adapted to the  short-term analyses. 
 
c) Relative strength index –method was developed in 1978 by J.Welles Wilder in 
USA. It compares the magnitude of recent gains/recent losses in order to show 
overtraded conditions of and asset: 
 
 
              100 
(3) RSI =100-1+RS 
 
where RS = average up closing of day X / average down closing of day X 
 
d) Moving average-method is a tool to evaluate time-series data of stock prices. 
In moving avere method stock prices are calculated in to the sum of digits and 
in effort to limit the effect of rapid movements in longer term short-term 
movements.  
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e) On balance volume, the OBV-method is used to find the momentum when to 
buy or sell the stock. It shows where a stock is traded by large number of 
buyers and sellers and thus predicts the upward or downward swing in the 
stock price. 
 
Technical analysts don´t know and don´t even specially want to know why a 
particular share´s price is predicted to rise or fall. All they know is that that is 
the movement implied by the following pattern. However, it has to be said that 
if chartism is to work, it imples that there are patterns in the behaviour of 
investors since it is very difficult to see how there might be pattern in the real-
world events driving the value of an individual company (Jones and Lumby 
1999). 
 
2.4.3 Noise  
 
A large amount of transactions in securities market is derived from so called 
noise traders. Their behavior can not be predicted by fundamental or technical 
analysis of financial market. Noise traders are market counterparts who sell and 
buy stocks  from the basis of irrelevant information. These speculative investors 
don´t have and are not interested in fundamental information to support their 
investment decisions and they trade irrationally. Neither they have inside 
information. Even if the nature of the activity is irrational, noise traders 
represent an important aspect of the functioning of the securities market: they 
reduce the risk of market crashes and facilitates transactions among agents 
(Black 1986). There exists rational noiser trading: they trade for example 
liquidity or tax purposes. There has to be these two kinds of trading in the well 
functioning financial markets: trading on information and trading on noise: 
 
1) noise makes trading in financial markets possible and because of the 
noise it is possible to observe prices and  
2) noise trading is essential to existence of liquid markets. This means that 
noise causes market to be somewhat inefficient but often also prevents 
taking advantage of inefficiencies. 
 
So called arbitrageurs can help in developing market to more efficient direction,  
but the noise traders behaving irrationally can do just the opposite. Noise 
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traders are useful to arbitrageurs in taking risk: arbitrageurs need a premium 
for their acitivity. The poorer performance of a noise trader is not a rule, 
because they may earn higher returns than arbitrageurs when investing in a 
riskier assets (Linnainmaa 2003). 
 
 
2.5 Anomalies 
 
The term anomaly describes the situation, when the central paradigm of any 
science is violated by discovery, which governs over the normal expectations of 
the specific  science (Kuhn 1962) In the efficient financial market the return of a 
stock should be determined by risk free interest rate and systematic risk, beta 
coefficient. There are several anomalies found and reported from different 
markets of the world, reliable, widely known and inexplicable patterns in 
returns.  When anomaly is discovered, it should disappear by actions of 
markets.  Still, empirical studies have shown the  irregularities in the returns of 
stocks continue to act in anomalous way which can not be explained by 
systematic risk. The existence of irregularities, also called anomalies, challenges 
the efficient market hypothesis  (Malkamäki 1990.) 
 
Widely diagnosed anomalies in finance are firm-specific, calendar and technical 
irregularities in stock market return patterns. Company-specific, cross-sectional 
return anomalies are for example the size effect, the earnings/price effect, 
price/book effect and calendar, time series return anomalies are turn of the year, 
beginning of the week and turn of the moth (Hawawini and Keim 1995).  
 
There is strong support that anomalies exists in even the most liquid and 
densely populated financial markets. Whether they can be exploited to earn 
returns in the future remains open to question. If anomalies do persist, 
transactions and hidden costs may prevent them being used to produce 
outperformance, as well as the rush of other investors trying to exploit the same 
anomalies. It may be possible that opportunities arise in quanta bursts and then 
disappear rather like the track in a cloud chamber. If so, by the time we wish to 
measure the recurrence of an event, it has occurred and passed by, unlikely to 
be repeated in the same form (Hawawini and Keim 1995). 
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2.5.1 Company-specific anomalies  
 
The size effect was first studied by Benz (1981) who found the causality 
between size and returns from. The size effect means that the stocks of a small 
capital companies gain higher returns than the mid or large capital companies. 
For example in a study from USA the companies having the market value 
among smallest 20 % of the companies gain 20 % higher return than the 
companies having the market value among the the biggest 20 % of a market. 
(Francies 1986). The size effect is combined in studies with the January-effect. It 
occurs mostly during the two first weeks of January, in some extent in February 
and March, but not significantly in the rest of the year (Brealey and Myers 
1996). This may be because of the taxation: many investors sell the stocks, that 
have performed poorly before the end of the taxation period in order to reduce 
taxes. When they allocate the funds again in the beginning of the year, then 
demand may rise the stock prices. (Bodie et al 1998).  
 
The earnings/price -anomaly states that the stocks with low price to earnings, 
P/E -ratio have better returns than the market average and stocks with high P/E 
-ratio. It was found by Basu (1977). He studied the numbers between P/E and 
returns of companies of New York Stock Exchange and the result was that there 
are higher returns in stocks with low than high P/E. Later on some strong 
evidence for the anomaly has been  found among others in studies from the 
USA,  United Kingdom and Japan. 
 
2.5.2 Time-specific  anomalies 
 
The January-effect is the best known time-specific anomaly. It refers to the fact 
that stocks have abnormally high returns in January. January-effect is mixed to 
the size-effect: particularly stocks of a small capital companies have performed 
in a excellent way in the beginning of the year, but as well large capital 
companies have had good return in comparison to the rest of the year. Also the 
stocks, that have performed poorly in the end of the year have abnormally high  
returns in January. The monthly stock returns were  examined from 17 
countries during January 1959 and December 1979 and found that all countries 
in the sample exhibited a large and positive mean return: in January the returns 
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were larger than in other months in 13 of the 17 countries analyzed. (Gultekin 
and Gultekin 1983) 
 
Turn of the month -effect stands that stocks show higher returns on the last day 
and first four days of the month.  Turn of the month effect may be resulted by 
cash flows at the end of the month, salaries, interest payments etc.  Martikainen 
et al (1994) investigated the phenomenon in 24 countries and in 12 regions of 
the world. They were motivated because the major of explanations offered for 
the (ir)regularity were based on the institutional factors and the wide data 
made it possible to reduce the risk of potential data snooping bias. They found 
the turn of the month –effect in several countries as well as for most regions 
studied. The strongest evidence was from U.S. markets: the returns of -1 day 
were higher than the returns of other turn of the month days. In Finnish market, 
stock index futures, options and cash market  the turn of the month –effect was 
found as well. Strong effect was found in the last trading week of the month. 
The effect seemed not to be sensitive to other seasonalities like turn of the year 
or day of the week. The behavior of mutual funds or expiration of stock index 
derivatives could not explain the effects  (Martikainen et al 1995).   If an investor 
acquires stocks regularly to her portfolio, it could be profitable to time the 
purchases to fit in to this pattern. Still, it is difficult if not impossible, because of 
trading costs and other market frictions. Investors should however, keep in mind 
that the difference is small and virtually impossible to take advantage of 
because of trading costs. 
 
Basis for the day of the week –anomaly is the fact that Monday is found to be 
the worst day to invest in stocks. The volatility and market sentiment developes 
during the week at the market.  Martikainen and Puttonen (1996) concluded 
that thin trading and short selling restrictions may lead to price delay and 
negativer returns in Tuesday. Restrictions varied in different financial market 
and caused different results in empirical studies. The problem was somehow 
diminished til the Nikkinen and Sahlström (2003) studied the impact of 
macroeconomical news on the Finnish market and found that the best returns 
were achieved on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays. It will be difficult to base 
a trading strategy for assumptions of the day of the week –effect, because the 
differences are small and there are positive costs for trading activity. The 
behavior of traders of different size was the interest of Kallunki and 
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Martikainen (1996). They discovered that while, small traders increase their sell 
orders in the beginning of the week, the large traders rather buy at that time.  
 
2.5.3 Other anomalies 
 
The post earnings announcement drift -anomaly was found by Ball and Brown 
(1968). The anomaly is based on the fact that the stock price reacts to 
announcements of a company and it is shown that  there is tendency in the 
market to react a prior the announcement. They showed that the announcement 
started to effect on the stock price already 12 months before the accrual 
announcement time. After the initial announcement the price changes tend to 
persist: stocks with positive surprises tend to continued to have better returns 
and those with negative surprises tend to continue to downward.  
 
When the company sets an initial price offering, IPO, of it´s shares to financial 
market, it is advantage for them and for the organizing investment bank that 
market buys the shares released. There is however evidence that initial price 
offers in aggregate doesn´t perform to it´s right extent and the same is 
underperforming is discovered with secondary offerings as well. In US market 
the average return in the first day of shares bought from IPO was 18.8 percent. 
In the longer period of three years, the IPO shares underperformed the value-
weighted market index by 23.4 percent (Ritter and Welch 2002).  
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3. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
 
Behavioral finance can be defined as the theory where psychological and 
behavioral measures are integrated in classical finance theories in order to 
understand the performance of the markets. Study of psychology and other 
social sciences can be used to explain irregularities of  financial markets. 
Human social and scientific research is on human and social cognitive and 
emotional biases to better understand the decision making (Shefrin 2000).  
 
The cornestone in the theory of modern finance is an efficient market 
hypothesis. It assumes that participants in the market are rational profit-
maximizers who actively effort to predict future market values of securities 
actively. All participants receive all the relevant information symmetrically and 
simultaneously and exploit it in a systematic and reasonable way. Thus the 
price of the security is correct all the time. Behavioral finance and traditional 
finance differs in a way that behavioral finance begins by relaxing assumption 
of investor rationality. Behavioral finance is concerned with questions on how 
investors err in their decisions and on how their assumed irrationality affects 
asset prices. It also documents differences and biases among investors, without 
always explicitly arguing that errors induce mispricing. Behavioral finance 
recognises the basis of the standard, traditional theory of finance, but inquires 
to complete it with own paradigms.  
 
The researchers and supporters of behavioral finance were challenged by Fama 
(1998) by claiming that following the standard scientific rule, theory of the 
market efficiency can only be replaced by a better theory. The alternative theory 
has a daunting task. It must specify what it is about investor psychology that 
causes simultaneous underreaction to some types of events and overreaction to 
others. Furthermore,  the alternative must present well-defined hypotheses to 
hypothesis of the efficient market, themselves potentially rejectable by 
empirical tests. 
 
The new paradigm of behavioral finance seeks to replace the behaviorally 
incomplete theory of finance now often referred to as standard or modern 
finance. Even as it seeks to be a replacement for the existing financial paradigm, 
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however, behavioral finance recognises that the existing paradigm can be true 
within specific boundaries. 
 
 
 
3.1 The concepts  of behavioral finance 
 
During the 1960es cognitive psychologists started to study decision making 
processes under uncertainty. There had been a connection between psychology 
and economic discussion, which had vanished, but advances made by 
psychologists came to attention of economists (Shefrin 2000). One of the first 
academics studying this field was  Simon (1955) aimed to construct definitions 
of “rational choice” that would be modeled more closely upon the actual 
decision processess in the behavior of organisations. Moreover, he wanted to 
model the individual behavior and decision making in organizational context. 
He assumed the behavior to be at least intendedly rational. In modeling there 
was approached presented where the lack of computing power turned out to be 
obvious.   
 
Slovic (1972) saw the relevance of behavioral concepts for finance and 
emphasized mispections about the risk. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) studied 
decision making judgments under uncertainty. They found three heuristic-
driven errors in people´s behavior: representativeness, availability of instances 
or scenarios and adjustment from an anchor. These heuristics are usually 
effective, but they lead a systematic and predicable errors.   
 
The two profounding theories of behavioral economics are the prospect theory 
by Kahneman and Tversky and a theory of mental accounting by Thaler (1980). 
In their work on prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provided a 
descriptive framework for the way people make choices under risk and 
uncertainty. The critique of their work was opposed against utility theory as a 
dominating model for decision making under risk.  
 
In prospect theory a value function represents utility over gains and losses, not 
levels of wealth as in utility theory. Gains and losses are measured with respect 
to a reference point, which is usually dependent of decision maker´s valuations. 
Small probabilities are overweighted and large ones are underweighted. S-
shaped value function is concave for gains and convex for losses and steeper for 
losses than for gains. This means that when the function is steeper for losses 
they hurt more than gains of the same size would please (Kaustia 2003). Utility 
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functon is more complex than conventional microeconomics models. It posits 
that utility depends on deviations from changing average points rather than on 
absolute levels of wealth or consumption (Scott et al 1999).  
 
 
Figure 1. The prospect theory function 
Financial decision makers tend to prefer avoiding losses instead of acquiring 
gains as the prospect theory states. This property of investors´ is called a loss 
aversion: they are twice as more distressed by losses than they are pleased by 
gains of same sum. People tend to gamble in losses and hold losing position too 
long and in hope of possible recovery of prices: the fact that is  shown by 
studies where people keep getting losses of bad investments, but sell good 
investments too soon. They tend to think, that there will be some kind of 
reverse in a stock market as a nature of law, even if that kind of patterns in 
stock returns doesn´t exist in the assumed efficient stock market. However, 
whereas the expected utility investor is approximately risk neutral over small 
gambles, the prospect theory investor is loss averse also over small gambles 
(Scott et al 1999).  
Many experimental studies have found evidence consistent with loss aversion 
and other predictions of prospect theory. In a study using actual market data it 
is found evidence of increased risk-taking in the domain of losses. Professional 
future traders, who experience losses in the morning, are more likely to take 
risks in the afternoon. This is consistent with loss aversion and motivation to 
break even (Kaustia 2003).   
 
The prospect theory is favorable for momentum investing strategy rather than 
contrarian strategy: if an investors behaves like he would have utility functions 
for losses and gains for every single series of stocks individually, it would cause 
unnecessary trading activity for portfolio. Rising stocks are to be sold too 
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quickly and depressing prices relative to fundamentals. Risk seeking in losses 
will effect on holding investments too long against declining prices  (Scott et al 
1999) 
 
Mental accounting means that people make decisions by dividing the financial 
decisions into groups of mental blocks. They name, categorise and evaluate 
economic outcomes into a different mental accounts. The theory was developed 
by Thaler (1980) but Kahneman and Tversky (1984) who were the first ones to 
use the exact term mental accounting in a sense that decision makers tend to 
separate financial matters into different classes in their justification. This causes 
the contradiction between the optimal solutions and actual decisions made. 
 
An example of mental accounting in the stock market is that people use rather 
dividends for consumption than more valuable stock holdings. Reason for this 
is that investors want to have separate accounts for consumption and 
investment and are reluctant to mix these two (Shefrin and Statman 1984).  
 
The tendency of selling winners too soon and holding losers too long is labeled 
the disposition effect by Shefrin and Statman (1985). Disposition effect means 
the selling dilemma in its original version. They identify several factors that can 
contribute to such behavior. The first is prospect theory: an investor with 
preferences given by prospect theory would become more risk-averse after 
experiencing gains, and risk-seeking after experiencing losses. This means that 
holding on to the investment becomes more attractive that selling if the value of 
the investment goes down, because the investor is willing to tolerate more risk. 
So the attractiviness of a stock´s risk-return profile is determined not only by 
issues pertaining to the stock, but also by the movements in the stock price that 
have occurred while the investor has been holding the stock. Whether this 
affects decisions on each stock that the investor is holding, or decisions 
concerning the investor´s stock portfolio as a whole, depends on how wide the 
investor´s perspective is (Kaustia 2003) 
 
Regret aversion is a part of the disposition effect. Having a loss in a stock 
market cause regret over initials of the activity and even features of cognitive 
dissonance, a consistency of continueing activities based on beliefs and opinions 
instead of more thorough judgment. Self-control means basically controlling 
emotion and is the factor that serves in explaining why the disposition effect is 
weaker at the end of the year. The rational half of the investor´s decision 
process recognises that realizing losses can be advantageous for tax purposes. 
However, the rrational half does not want to follow tax optimizing investment 
rules due to the factors mentioned above. Shefrin and Statman (1984) conjecture 
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that investors find it easier to exercise their will power in getting rid of loss-
making stocks with explicit self-control mechanisms. One such mechanism is 
the deadline for the enf or the tax year. There is also rational reasons for not 
selling stock which have performed poorly but which have performed good in 
the past. First: they may balance their portfolio by selling winner-stocks if a 
large price increases have skewed the diversification. Second, they may have 
information which they rationally believe have not yet incorporated the price of 
a stock fully. Third, high transaction costs of a low value investment may make 
it unrational to sell loser-stocks (Odean 1998).  
 
Disposition effect is partly  a question of numbers: if a man pays 1000 money 
units for the house, and it´s market value goes up to 2000 money units, the price 
of the house is after the rise psychologically 2000. If the price of the house 
collapes to 1000 money units, the 2000 money units stays as intrinsic price of the 
house. The same goes with the stocks: for some people the intrinsic price of a 
stock may be 90 money units, even if the latest closing price is only 5 money 
units.  
 
The disposition –effect is partly reason for the stock splits. If the price of a stock 
has risen constantly, the company sets the price of a stock back to the “digits” 
investors are used to see it. The same may occur reversely, when so called cent-
stocks are given a new, more creditable price by a reverse split. Investors think 
that 100 € is a too high and 0.20 € too low price for a stock. 
 
 
3.2 Decision making 
 
The researchers of behavioral finance claim that a few psychological 
phenomena are the general source where all the for the different interpretations 
of behavior of decision makers are led (Shefrin 2000): 
 
1) Heuristic-driven bias  
2) Frame dependance 
3) Market are inefficient 
 
Heuristic-driven bias means, that people find thing by trial and error and this 
leads them to develop heuristics, rules of thumbs. Representativeness is making 
decision by stereotypes: the winner-loser-effect is an example of that. When 
investors get constant and long-lasting information about a good performance 
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of a stock, too optimistic views are potential to raise when analysing the 
investment. In some cases, the announcements of a companies have continued 
to build a representative bias (Barberis et al 1998).  
 
Overconfidence guides people. If asked, 65 – 80 percent of people  think they 
are better at driving car than average. Same kind of overconfidence in the 
financial markets leads to false investment decisions. Basic point is, that active 
trading strategy will underperform in the efficient market. There are rarely 
private information available and overconfident investor will overestimate the 
value of private information and having too much confidence in relation to 
information leads to too frequent trading. Trading costs and bid ask spread will 
make the potential extra gain to disappear. There are studies, where the 
differences  between male and female traders are found (Barber and Odean 
2000). The same way, experienced investors will perform better than 
inexperienced investors because of difference of confidence (Statman 2000). The 
stocks, that are more difficult to value  are found to generate greater 
overconfidence among investors. To this class  belongs the growth or glamour 
stocks, or small, illiquid stocks (Daniel et al 1998).    
 
Olsen (1998) described the potential psychological attributes of a decision 
maker: his preference is multi-faceted, open to change and often formed during 
the decision process itself. He tend to adaptive to the environment in which the 
decision is made so that it contribute to their selection of a decision process and 
technique. Finally, a decision maker seeks rather satisfactory than optimal 
solution. In investment-related decision making the following features can be 
seen: prices don’t feel right because they are not predictable. If excessive price-
volatility or bubbles occur, people act as sheeps in a herd: the follow a advisors 
as shepherd. They sell the winning stocks too early and overreact to new 
market information. Investors mistake good companies for good investments 
and belief in the value of time diversification. Generally, people behave like 
applied scientists, not according the paradigms of finance and correct 
knowledge but mixed features like sharing, believing and hoping. 
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3.3  Bubbles and crashes  in the stock market 
 
  
Sometimes financial markets go through periods of irrational cycles and 
unfundamentally based values of securities. First market moves explosively 
upward generating unsustainable prices and then follows the crash. The 
upward swing may last for many years, but the crash is usually very 
rapid.There are a few market crashes and bubbles in the history. One of the first 
bubbles based on speculation was the tulip mania of the Netherlands in 1637-
1637. It was caused by peak demand of tulip bulb which lifted the prices to 
heights. The best known crashes of a modern time are the ones of US stock 
market,  in October 1929 and in October 1987.   
 
There was a powerful upswing-downswing cycle also during 1999 -2001 in all 
the stock exchanges of developed countries, including Finland. Specially stocks 
of companies related to information technology had a huge burst in their 
returns. New technological breakthrough, World Wide Web, also known as 
internet and its applications and prerequisites were considered to be same kind 
of revolution like the tulips, railroad, the telephone, the automobile or the 
personal computer before in history. One explanation for the bubble was that 
that market sentiment got separated from market fundaments, once again.  
 
Definitions of a bubble is: 
 
a) an economic cycle characterized by rapid expansion followed by a 
contraction. 
 
 b) a surge in equity prices, often more than warranted by the fundamentals and 
usually in a particular sector, followed by a drastic drop in prices as a massive 
selloff occurs. 
 
C) a theory that security prices rise above their true value and will continue 
to do so until prices go into freefall and the bubble bursts. 
 
If the market were efficient, any bubbles would not exist. All the information 
would be reflected in the prices and prices would reflect the fundamentals. The 
contagion effect means that there becomes high concensus of prices at market 
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and investors rely too much to this common truth of security prices. This kind 
of investors are so called informational freeloaders. In a way, these freeloaders 
form a basics for efficient market, but there the prerequisite is, that the price 
and information they base their activities are right. It isn´t always the case, so 
speculative bubbles may occur in the stock market.  It happens when the asset 
prices deviate form market fundamentals. Such deviations can be seen as 
bubbles, which reflect disturbances and craziness of market. It is not possible to 
derive a general definition for a bubble, the researchers could find different 
models for the same data used. 
 
Treynor (1999) defined that rational behavior of individual investor can cause a 
market bubble. The bubble in a financial market occurs in a following pattern: 
Initial wealth distribution =>  Initial price change => Wealth transfer resulting 
from interaction of holdings and price changes => New equilibrium holdings 
and price resulting in further price change. Then the third and the fourth 
feature of a pattern will form a cycle which causes the market bubble and 
eventually crash when the investor runs out of funds.In other words, the 
forecaster makes repeated forecasts of a quantifiable, still uncertain future event 
as new information arrives. Forecasts will have an expectation: as the forecast 
changes, the forecaster´s expectation will change.  
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4. STOCK MARKET OVERREACTION 
 
For the last 30 years, the efficient market hypothesis has been one of the most 
dominant themes in financial research. While the efficiency of the stock market 
was once virtually taken for granted, it is now being seriously questioned again, 
primarily due to the recent evidence on the return reversal behavior of stock 
prices i.e. the prior period´s worst stock return performers (losers) outperform 
the prior period´s best return performers (winners) in the subsuquent period. 
This potential violation of the efficient market hypothesis is labeled the 
“overreaction phenomenon” because it suggests that the market has 
overreacted in the initial period, and that it subsuquently corrects itself. 
 
The efficient market hypothesis states in its strong-form that unanticipated 
return is not correlated with any information i.e. price reflect all existing 
information, be it publicly available or insider. This would mean, that prices 
would always be fair and no investor would be able to consistently superior 
forecasts of stock prices (Brealey & Myers 1988).   
 
The overreaction hypothesis in stock market states that stocks with poor 
performance over a certain period of time will perform well over the next and 
similar time interval. This means, that winning stocks in period P tend to 
become losers in period P+1  and opposite. Some contrarian strategies taking a 
long position in past extreme loser stocks and a short position in past extreme 
winner stocks have been developed and exercised with success.  The concept of 
overreaction is originally based on work of experimental psychologists, 
Kahnemann and Tversky (1982), who find people tend to overreact to 
unexpected and extreme events. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) stated that the 
question: what is an approriate reaction, when term overreaction carries with it 
an implicit comparison to some degree of reaction that is considered to be 
appropriate? The overreaction hypothesis claims further  that investors are 
inclined to digest information irrationally and have a disposition of placing too 
much weight on more current events. In other words, investors ordinarily 
interpret new information, be it available or unavailable, in a systematically 
biased manner. They tend to be either over-optimistic or over-pessimistic, with 
no room in between. Under such a scenario, equity prices are not equitably 
determined by the “true” forces of the time, especially when new information 
or extreme events arrive. Although stock prices would go abnormally high or 
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low due to investors´ overreaction in the initial period, they have a tendency to 
adjust themselves back to the equilibrium level in the subsequent period. The 
stock price movement enjoys a systematic pattern and can be predicted 
beforehand under the assumption of the overreaction hypothesis. If that is the 
case, smart investors can exploit this opportunity of predictable reversal by 
implementing some sort of contrarian trading strategies for speculating or for 
hedging.  
 
The basic contradiction between efficient market hypothesis and overreaction 
hypothesis is: 
 
-  according to efficient market hypothesis contrarian strategy should not be 
profitable for a investor and there should be no difference what kind of returns 
there has been for a security in history.   
 
- according to overreaction hypothesis the contrarian strategy is profitable: past 
“loser” security should become “winner” security in the future.  
 
A true or false conclusion reached in the overreaction hypothesis is, that even if 
there exists relevance to time frame of the return interval adopted, how is the 
situation with a risk stationary, firm size and seasonality?  Furthermore, many 
researchers have reached results about the overreaction hypothesis in both 
developed and emerging markets due to the variable factors of the study 
process. That’s why the usefulness of contrarian strategies which are built upon 
the overreaction hypothesis need to be investigated with an multi-angled 
approach.  
 
 
 
4.1 Overreaction – empirical evidence 
 
Some evidence to support the overreaction hypothesis and document in the 
literature was first presented by Rosenborg and Rudd (1982). They claimed how 
trader who is just concerned about the mean and the variance of the portfolio 
return would predict the future return by buying the stock with highest 
predicted returns and selling the stocks with lowest predicted returns to his 
portrolio. Exploiting the data about previous months returns would be able to 
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constitute a portfolio with good performance. The study by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985), a simple stock market investment motivated by work in cognitive 
psychology on intuitive prediction,  provided the confirmation of a price 
reversal over a three-year return interval are the most prominent and influential 
in stimulating the ongoing research: there was  evidence of contrarian profits 
about 25 percent above the market average. Because of this finding, DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) provided evidence "loser" portfolios outperform "winner" 
portfolios by approximately 25% and that in the U.S. equity market it would be 
profitable to apply a  contrarian strategy. Their data consisted of stock returns 
of over 50 years.  
 
In the further study  by  De Bondt and Thaler (1987) the objective was to find 
the evidence and behavioral view for the notion that many investors were poor 
Bayesian decision makers: they tend to overreact ie. give too much weight on 
the recent information and underweight the base rate data. They concluded that 
as a investor overreaction to earnings, the stock prices could depart from their 
underlying fundamental values.  
 
Their findings for the research questions were:  
 
1) Excess returns for losers are negatively correlated in both long and short term 
returns, because January effect has negative correlation for returns a prior 
December. 
 
2) Difference between winners and losers cannot be attributed to changes in a 
risk as measured by CAPM-betas, they are inappropriate for adjusting the risk 
in extreme performance portfolios 
 
3)  Difference between winners and losers is not primarily a size effect 
 
4) The small firm effect is to some extent a losing firm effect, but even if the 
losing firm effect is removed there are still excess returns to small firms 
 
5) The earnings of winning and losing firms show reversal patters consistent 
with overreaction. 
 
6) Investors overreact to short-term earning movements.  
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Zarovin (1990) pointed some critics against DeBondt´s and Thaler´s evidence on 
stock market tendency for losers over the prior 3-year period to beat winners 
during that period in the subsuquent 3-year period. He found the losers became 
winners, but claimed that not because of overreaction, but size effect. This is an 
example how different results can be get of similar data.  
 
Fama (1998)  defended the efficient market by reasoning  that an efficient 
market generates categories of events that individually propose that security 
prices overreact to information. Market efficiency is however consistent with 
apparent overreaction and underreaction, if the frequency of both anomalies is  
about the same overreaction. Roughly even split between apparent overreaction 
and underreaction is a good description of the many of existing anomalies. If 
the long-term return anomalies show to be large enough, that they cannot be 
attributed to chance, then an even split between over- and underreaction is not 
sign of efficiency. On the other hand, long-term anomalies are most dependent 
of methodology.  
 
 
4.2  Momemtum and contrarian strategies 
 
Momentum theories assume that stock prices move slowly and smoothly over 
time. The contrarian theories have an opposite view about the issue: they 
propose the large and sharp change in price movements (Fama and Blume 
1966). Ball et al(1995) claim that stock prices underreact and overreact under the 
continuation and contrarian theories respectively and both theories are not 
consistent with the efficient market theory. Long-term stock market 
overreaction was found  in works by Clare and Thomas (1995), Larkomaa (1999)  
DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987). Contrarian strategy realized significant 
abnormal returns in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) work where they studied  six 
month returns of US stocks during 1965-1989. The returns of the loser portfolio 
for subsuquent 36 months realized positive returns in each of the 12 month after 
the formation date.  
 
Article of Richards (1997) explored potential explanations for reversals of 
national stock markets over periods of several years. He found no evidence for 
the hypothesis that the reversals reflect risk differentials. Test period winners 
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are no riskier than prior winners in terms  of their standard deviations, their 
correlations with the world market return or other risk factors. He argued that 
winner-loser reversals are due to market imperfections like price discrepancies 
given the uncertainty in the valuation of equities. Cross-border equity flows 
were found to be insufficient and that implicated overreaction or “small-
country –effect”: if fads and investor misperceptions do exist in a small country, 
so  international investors, who have a momemtum investment strategy, make 
the phenomenon even larger. US investors inflows into financial markets of 
another country funds often to be positively correlated with recent 
performance. Evidence for this fact that foreign investors are momentum 
traders and have a better performance than domestic investors was found by 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) in the Finnish stock market. Sophisticated 
foreign investors were patient enough to wait til the time to sell was right, 
when unsophisticated domestic investors couldn´t act the same way. 
Sophistication isn´t here maybe only because of nationality, foreign investors 
were mostly institutions and anticipated to have better skills than domestic 
house-hold investors. Ekholm (2002) studie the behavior of different investor 
types: financial companies, companies and households. He blaimed the 
overconfidence to be a reason for the poor success of small, household 
investors: they misunderstood the information in a biased way. After a bad 
news small investors tend to sell buy and after good news to buy stocks: they 
think that the price of a stock is low, if it has come down five percent of it’s a 
prior price. The source of their information is for example the discussion forums 
of internet, where some “insider” hints are given for free. 
 
According to Hong and Stein (1999) there are two types of investors in the 
market: newswatchers (informed traders) and momentum traders (liquidity 
traders). The news watchers trade only on the private information about 
fundamentals, momemtum traders trade only on past price movements. The 
overreaction is caused by momemtum traders. Daniel et al (1998) states that 
prices initially overreact to news about fundamentals and continue to move 
away, before reverting to fundamental value eventually. 
 
Some confirmations for the short-term overreaction hypothes has been found in 
the world´s stock markets. Brown and Harlow (1988) and Atkins and Dyl (1990) 
provide evidence that significant price reversals would follow scurities that 
experience one-day price declines. A similar result of a three-day price recovery 
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for Fortune 500 firms suffering price declines of 10 percent of more is 
documented by Bremer and Sweeney (1991). Cox and Peterson (1990) find 
significant reversals in study where NASDAQ stock returns followed one-day 
price declines of at least 10 percent.   
 
The return of the positive returns from three to twelwe month holding period 
by buying loser stocks and selling winners was found by Jegadeesh xand 
Titman (1993). Chang, McLeavey and Rhee (1995) viewed the monthly 
abnormal returns earned by implementing a short-term contrarian strategy in 
the Japanese stock market. They noted that Japanese contrarian profits are due 
mainly to market overreacton or to a lead-lag structure in share prices.  In Japan 
the January –effect was not a critical factor. They found, furthermore, that there 
are abnormal profit whether the losers are smaller of greater than winners and 
the magnitude of the profits does not differ. For the last, strong symmetry exists 
between the performance of the two extreme portfolios. Support for the 
magnitude effect is presented in the study of Pettengill and Jordan (1998): the 
firms with the greatest monthly loss becoming the greatest winners in the next 
month.   
 
The empirical findings that favor the overreaction hypothesis, both short term 
and long term, are substantial. Some researchers, however, suggest different 
explanations for this market inefficiency. Cox and Peterson (1994), for instance, 
are in belief that price reversal is the combined result of a bid-ask bounce and 
the extent of market-liquidity, and they don´t find evidence consistent with an 
overreaction hypothesis. Ball et al (1995) detect that the apparent one-week 
profitability of contrarian trading strategy is largely disappeared  after 
calculating returns from bids instead of ask prices.  
 
The key features of the short-term contrarian strategies implemented in 
previous works of were investigated in study of Conrad and Gultekin (1997). 
First they analyzed the possibility of overreaction in financial markets. They 
remind that even if virtually any model of overreaction gives the result that 
returns are negatively autocorrelated for some holding period, the 
measurement errors in stock prices will also lead to negative autocorrelation in 
returns. The studies that show positive due to price reversals, may not be 
evidence of the overreaction but may instead be a consequence of market 
microstructure effects, such as the bid-ask bounce.  Second they showed that 
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low levels of transaction costs eliminate all profits to strategies that try to 
benefit from overreactions of markets. Amount of the transactions costs 
documented could be less than 0.20 %.  Data of their empirical analysis was 
limited to NASDAQ firms in 1985 – 1989 period and NYSE firms in 1990 – 1991. 
All the documented profitability of price reversals of NASDAQ and the most of 
the price reversals of NYSE could be explained by bid-ask bounce.  
 
Using the same data but a longer event in their study, contrarian strategy 
realized significant abnormal returns in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) work 
where they studied  six month returns of US stocks during 1965-1989. The 
returns of the loser portfolio for subsuquent 36 months realized positive returns 
in each of the twelwe month after the formation date. Zarowin (1989), 
controlling the size and January effects, also leads support for the short-run 
overreaction hypothesis via the use of a one month return performance. 
 
In addition to the problem of the bid-ask spread, some other puzzles such as 
firm size effect, seasonality, and risk stationarity have been proposed. Chan 
(1988) using a simple asset pricing model, the CAPM, to control the risk change, 
observed a very small return from contrarian investment strategies which 
might not be economically significant. Ball and Kothari (1989) further proved 
that the model and estimation methods used to evaluate the overreaction 
hypothesis are sensitive to the results because of the time-varying risk of 
arbitrage strategies. Supporting arguments of January effect, Pettengill and 
Jordan (1990) also provide evidence that most of the overreaction arises in 
January.  
 
As for the firm size, Zarowin (1990), applying a three-year test period, finds the 
contrarian investment strategy works well only for small firms.  Zarowin (1989) 
however proposes that even if the long-run overreaction effect may be 
subsumed by size and seasonality the evidence indicated by using monthly 
return suggests the stock market appears to be characterized by short-run 
overreaction.  
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4.3  Stock market overreaction in Finland 
 
Fast (1992) studied the the short-term overreaction in Helsinki Stock Exchange. 
The period was from 1979 to 1988 and data consisted of all the stock series. His 
first hypothesis was, that there is significant short-term overreaction in the 
Finnish stock market (the directional effect) and the second hypothesis that the 
possible overreaction would depend on the power of the initial effect, (the 
magnitude effect). 
 
The return was counted: 
 
(4)   ERit =rit -ai-birmt    
 
Where:  
 
Abnormal return of a stock i during test period t = stock i return during test 
period t – alfa and beta coefficient tested by market model during test period t x 
return of a market during test period t.  
 
There existed both directional and magnitude effect in the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange and hypotheses held  the test. The concluding remark in this study 
was however the fact that result may be influenced by thin trading and 
powerfully random movements of stock prices.   
 
Mänttäri (2005) couldn´t confirm Fast´s (1992) findings. He didn´t find 
economically meaningful short-term over- or underreaction based on the 
previous short-term price behavior of the winner and loser portfolios. There 
may exist periodical overreactions, but when more stocks are investigated for 
the longer period, the overreaction is no longer indicated. Further finding was, 
that foreign investor drive the market, and there may exist overreaction due to 
their actions, but these are unpredictable and thus impossible to exercise in 
sense for trading. 
 
Long-term overreaction was studied in the Finnish stock market by Larkomaa 
(1999). The attempt was to find answers if the overreaction is similar in small 
emerging exchange and in international exchanges and if the overreaction effect 
could be used to alternative risk estimation approaches. Further, the anomalies 
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like January-effect and size-effect were to be found if they existed 
simultaneously with overreaction and the risk-adjustment seemed to 
strenghtenthe reversal effect in portfolios. The data of the study was 1970 – 
1996. The quality of data set some challenges to researcher, but he found the 
overreaction in the narrow Finnish market. Footnote was, however, that the 
Finnish stock market has experienced a dramatic structural changes over 
decades and even if the purpose of the study was to give viewpoints to the 
international discussion, it may be difficult. 
 
Believers in efficient markets may say that this procedure should not work in 
informationally efficient markets since stock prices would react instantaneously 
to "news" about the firm, or the economy. Therefore, securities will quickly 
become correctly priced. But some researchers do not believe that the market 
always responds rationally. Skeptics often claim that the market has a short-
term obsession with earnings and the market overreacts to news. Further, the 
skeptics claim that this overreaction creates opportunities for investors to buy 
solid stocks at attractive prices. Therefore the question remained as an empirical 
question (Högholm & Prather 1998).  
 
4.4  The Helsinki Stock Exchange 
 
The Helsinki Stock Exchange opened on October 1912.  In London, England, the 
stocks were traded already on 16th century, and probably the best known stock 
exchange, New York in USA was founded in 1792.  Helsinki Stock Exchange It 
remained a so called free form financial association until in 1984 when it was 
converted into a co-operative owned by banks, traders, other companies and 
associations. On April 1, 1990 trading was transferred  to a new digital system 
called HETI (at once in Finnish) which replaced the electro-mechanical trading 
board introduced in 1935. Digital trading system HETI has enabled remote 
traders to do transactions on equal terms with those in the trading room.  
 
Since 1995 the co-operative has expanded its activities and merged with several 
clearing and stock deposite companies and associations. There has been 
established a powerful organisation for markets of Northern Europe: in 1998 the 
company bought the Finnish derivative exchanges in 1998 and was re-named to 
HEX, in the beginning of the 21st century HEX acquired a majority of the Tallinn 
Stock Exchange in Estonia and Riga Stock Exchange in Latvia and  in 2003 HEX 
merged with OM AB, owner of the Stockholm Stock Exchange in Sweden. The  
new company was later renamed to OMX.  
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One important milestone of the history of Helsinki stock exchange happened in 
1993 when the foreign ownership was freed. Nowadays foreign investors are 
responsible from 50 percent even to 70 percent of the daily trading volume.  
 
There are three main indexes in the Helsinki Stock Exchange: the all-share 
index, the cap index and the index that consists of 25 most actively tradet stock 
of the exchange.  
 
The oldest of the indexes, all-share index was established in 1987.  The OMX 
Helsinki All-Share Index, as it has been called after the fusion in 2005,  includes 
all the shares listed on the Helsinki. The goal of the index is to reflect the 
current status and price changes in the market. The OMX Helsinki Cap index is 
weight capped version of all-share index where the maximum weight of one 
share is limited to 10% of total market value of the index.  
 
OMX Helsinki 25 is the leading share index of Helsinki Stock Exchange. It 
consists of the 25 most actively traded stocks on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
and is a capitalization weighted stock price index. The maximum weight of one 
company is limited to 10 percent and the composition of the OMXH25 index is 
revised twice a year. The numbers of shares used to compute the market value 
are determined on a quarterly basis. The limited number of participants 
guarantees that all the underlying shares of the index have excellent liquidity, 
which results that the index is highly suitable as underlying for derivatives 
products. OMXH25 is used as a benchmark index for management of 
diversified Finnish stock portfolios.  
 
Helsinki Stock Exchange index was established in 1987.  In the beginning of the 
1990´es there were a depression in the Finnish Economy, which can be seen in 
the stock exchange as well: the lowest value of index was 541 points in 
September 1992.  In the end of 1990 ´es and in the beginning of the 2000´es there 
was a massive burst in value of shares: HEX-index reached its all time highest 
valuation in March 2000, 18277 points.  
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Figure 2  Helsinki Stock Exchange all-share index 1987 -2005.  
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5 DATA, METHODOLOGY AND THE RESULTS OF A STUDY 
 
 
5.1  Time period and selection of data 
 
Stock return price data for this study was from database of Department of 
Accounting and Finance of University of Vaasa. Primary ata contained all the 
shares of Helsinki Stock Exchange OMX  and its  time window is  from January 
1st 2002 to December 31st 2007. There were 1572st observated closing prices for a 
single company, which had a traded share in the marketplace for the whole 
time period of the study. In the empirical studies where the data window is for 
example from the beginning of the 20th century to 21st century, there are 
thousands of observations of extreme returns. Question is, if the number of 
observations is the correcting factor in the case of old data and old-fashioned 
market formation. 
 
There existed some questions of selecting a decent data for the study: of all the 
stocks Large and Mid Cap companies of the Helsinki Stock Exchange were 
accepted because of proper price formation and a sufficient volume of trading. 
Stocks of small cap companies were rejected because of possible illiquidity and 
bid-ask spreads. For example, return of a so called cent stocks may vary from 
0.06 cents to 0.07 cents and then back to 0.06 cents. If this data would be 
accepted, it would skew the result badly when the observation accepted  is + or 
-10 %: every 0.06 cents to 0.07 cents would be a observation, but the trading 
strategy can not be based to these. This takes out the effect of the size-effect, 
where smaller companies show abnormally high returns when compared to 
bigger. Also another limitation was executed: there are firms which have stocks 
with two different series. Because of the some special features of these stocks, 
only the common stock of these is accepted and preferred stocks are rejected of 
the study. Price behavior of these two series may be similar, but the exploitation 
of the notion of a one company twice in form of a finding or occasion, 10 % 
price reversal,  would give too much weight on the result and is thus rejected. 
Dividends and splits were taken into account and rejected of the data used.  
 
During the study window, the Helsinki Stock Exchange index has developed in 
a curve seen in the figure below. The reason for rejecting the data a prior year 
2002 was that there existed the bubble or cycle in the stock prices, especially 
between the years 1999 – 2001 which would have pictured the abnormal result 
and non-usable implications for the possible trading strategy proposed. The 
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development of the prices in the Finnish stock market has been more moderate 
during 2002 – 2007 and thus suitable for a study like this. 
 
In the figure of price development of the Helsinki Stock Exchange it can be seen 
that the returns have risen slowly, but fallen in shorter period of time. Even if 
there has been fluctuation in the market during 2002 - 2007, the prices have 
been acting in a relatively smooth way. 
 
  
 
Figure 3  OMX Helsinki index July 2001 – January 2008.  
 
 
 
5.2 Method of the study 
 
The method of the study was time-series return prediction. First the stock 
which have had there returns of over  10 %  in a one day were picked and 
investigated to which direction the returns reverse (if)  in the next day and four 
days after that. Both “winner-stocks”,  that is,  stocks, which have had a return 
of + 10% or more in a one day and “loser-stocks”, which have had a return of -
10% or less in a one day were selected to be findings of the study. 
 
Brown & Harlow (1988) proposed three different effects to be a simple 
summation of overreaction hypothesis based on DeBondt and Thaler (1985):  
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I The directional effect, i.e. extreme movements in equity prices will be followed 
by movements in the opposite direction  
II The magnitude effect i.e. the more extreme the initial price change, the more 
extreme the offsetting reaction 
III The intensity effects i.e. the shorter the duration of the initial price change, 
the more extreme the subsequent response.  
 
The question of this study was to see if there exists directional effect of the 
overreaction hypothesis in the Finnish stock market. If there exists reversal in 
returns of stocks, that have lost over 10 % of their value in the day before, can it 
be used to adapt a contrarian trading strategy. Fast (1992) had found the 
support for the directional and magnitude effect in the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange, but because the basic assumption of this study was, that there occur 
large reversals in returns in stock market nowadays, but they are usually not 20 
% or 30 % of a prior price, so the magnitude was left out of the study range. The 
time window of the study was 1, 2 ,3 ,4 and five days after the initial price 
change of over 10 %, so the intensity effect was studied. The main interest was, 
still,  the behavior of the stock in the first day after the extreme movement. 
 
Brown and Harlow (1988) used the formula: 
 
(5) uit = rit - E(Rit)   
 
where   
uit =  cumulative excessive returns of a stock i in time t 
rit =  return of a stock i in time t 
E(Rit) =  expected return of a stock j in time t 
 
They corrected the systematic risk of the study by rejecting part of cumulative 
excessive returns when the market had been acting to the same direction.  
 
In this study there are no calculated the return of a market portfolio, because of 
its expected minor effect in time window from one  to five days and because of 
the rapid change in the price of one stock. 
 
An event study is a method of empirical study of a prices of a securitys before 
and after an for example announcement, divided or merger. It is used to make 
predictions of the behavior of a price of security in the future. Using the 
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financial market data, it measures the impact of a special event at the market. 
Event study if fast and useful because it shadows the effect of an event 
immediately in security prices, when some  information can be seen even 
months after the original event. An event study is a direct test to market 
efficiency where the joint problem is not major problem. 
 
Event study is has many applications and is a wide spread in accounting an 
finance research, but the most often used field is a effect of a event like mergers 
and acquisitions, earnings announcements, issues of new dept or equity and 
variety of macroeconomical issues (MacKinlay, A.C (1997). 
 
Event study is a test for a rapid price adjustment, where purpose is to measure 
stock markets response to a particular information release. In this study the 
initial information release is the rapidly changed abnormal return of a stock. In 
event study the data is a stock and market-index return and the estimation 
period varies from 260 to 10 days a prior the event, here in this study the 
assumption of the returns before are irrelevant because the fast reaction is 
measured. In the event study the significance must be tested. 
 
A measure of location or central tendency is a way of describing a large 
frequency distribution by means of a single value. The data to be analysed must 
be at least of interval status. The main measures of location in common use are 
the mean, the median and the mode. The mode is the most frequently occurring 
value in a frequency distribution and the mean is the arithmetical average of a 
frequency distribution, but of these three are  median and mode  not a study 
interest of this subject (Hussey and Hussey 1997). 
 
Mean is used to discover the general returns of the stocks the day after a initial 
+ or – 10 % change in the closing price. 
 
The formula of the mean is:  
 
(6) mean = ∑x / n   where 
 
x =  each observation 
n =  the total number of observations 
∑ =  the sum of   
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When positive of negative change of 10 % was found in stock price, it was 
found out what kind of closing prices there were for the next five days each 
separately. 
 
 
5.3 Results of the study 
 
In this study there were positive and negative 10% one day closing price returns 
investigated. Data consisted of  daily returns of  Helsinki Stock Exchange OMX 
Large and Mid Cap stocks during  1.1.2002 – 31.12.2007. Small Cap stocks were 
rejected because of possible big bid-ask spreads, lack of market liquidity and 
other skewnesses in their returns.  
 
There were 127 pieces of  positive and 135 pieces of negative occasions found, 
where the daily return exceeded ± 10%. Companies included were totally 64. 
 
 
5.3.1 The year of the observation 
 
The highest frequency of findings was in the beginning of the study window: in 
a year 2002 and 2003 there were 48 and 32 findings in +10 % daily return section 
and 41 and 20  in -10% daily return section. In 2005 and 2006 there were only 6 
and 7 winner observations and 22 and 35 observations summed. In 2002 and 
2003 there were notable fluctuation in the market, but from year 2004 to 2007 
the market has been developing steadily.  
 
 
 
Table 2  The year of the observation 
 
Year Winner Loser 
2002 48 41 
2003 32 20 
2004 14 21 
2005 7 22 
2006 6 16 
2007 20 15 
N 127 135 
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5.3.2  The month of the observation 
    
The most common month of +10% returns was October with 25 occasions. In 
January there were 17 occasions, but all the other months had under 15 
observations. In the month of December there were only 5 pieces of +10% 
returns found. In January there has been anomaly found but October can not be 
explained in that sense. The most  of -10 % returns was observed in  July, 20 
occasions. In August there were 15 occasions and in April 16 occasions.  The 
least -10% days there were in June, 5 pieces. In January, February and December 
there as well only few, 6 occasions in each month. Standard deviation is for 
negative months 4,64 and for positive months 5,96. 
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Table  3 The month of +10% return 
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Table 4 The month of -10% return 
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5.3.3 The day of month of  observation 
 
In the stock markets of world there has been found a anomalies referring to 
abnormal returns in a specific day of the week. Here it is shown that in case of  
+ or - 10 % return doesn´t happen in any specific day. There are 10 findings in 
the second day of month and seven findings in the 11th, 18th, 23th and 25th day of 
the month, but special pattern can´t be seen in negative portfolio. In a negative 
portfolio the most populated day is the 18th with 10 findings and 26th with 9 
findings. According to table 6, the negative return doesn´t happen in the 4th, 19th 
or the 24th day of the month. 
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Table 5 The day of month +10% return 
 
Day of month -10% return
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Table 6 The day of month of -10% retur 
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5.4 Returns from day one to day five, the original data 
 
There can be seen a clear sign of a reversal in a return in day 1 after the +10 % 
and -10% return. In the first day after +10% return, so called winner side of the 
phenomenom  has a average return of -0,544 %. In the first day after -10%, so 
called loser stocks give return of 1,258 %. Difference between these two returns  
are 1,769%.  
 
Cumulatively the direction to the return seems to be born in the first day: there 
is no massive returns during days 2,3,4 or 5 after the initial price change of +- 10 
%. In the day two after the ±10% return there doesn´t occur that kind of reversal 
in returns except in the day three in the winner side, where the return is -0,359 
percent. Similarly, the return of the day 2 in the winner portolio is somehow 
abnormal by 0,313 %. 
 
 
Day  Winner % mean Loser % mean 
1 -0,544 1,258 
2 0,313 0,159 
3 -0,359  0.164 
4 0,049  0,127 
5 -0,059 -0,021 
Cumulative return -0,057 1,692 
Table 7 The returns of winner and loser portfolios 
 
DAY 
Winner 
Z-test 
Loser 
Z-test 
Winner 
standard 
deviation 
Loser 
standard 
deviation 
Confidence 
interval 
95% W  
Confidence 
interval 
95% W 
Confidence  
interval 
95% L 
Confidence 
interval 95 
% L 
1 0.4999 0,4997 4,377 4,213 (-1,305 0,217) (0,564 1,969) 
2 0,4994 0,4865 3,701 3,164 (-0,331 0,957) (-0,375 0,693) 
3 0,5005 0,5152 3,178 2,636 (-0,912 0,194) (-0,279 0,607) 
4 0,4995 0,5014 3,361 3,364 (-0,518 0,616) (-0,143 0,677) 
5 0,5009 0,5014 2,659 2,997 (-0,521 0,403) (-0,559 0,601) 
 
Table 8  Z-test, standard deviation and confidence intervals  
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5.4.1 Returns from day one to day 5,  smoothed data 
 
 
In the next operation the ten most extreme daily returns are rejected of the 
findings of + or – 10 percent returns.  Five positive and five negative findings 
were deleted of the  portfolio. The result is that the first day pattern remains 
basically the same as in portfolio formed of the original data with all the 
findings. 
 
There can still be seen a clear sign of a reversal in a return in day 1 after the +10 
% and -10% return. In the first day after +10% return, so called winner side of 
the phenomenom  has a average return of -0,452%. In the first day after -10%, so 
called loser stocks give return of 1,232 %. Difference between these two returns  
are 1,684% 
 
Cumulatively the direction to the return seems to be born in the first day: there 
is no massive returns during days 2,3,4 or 5 after the initial price change of +- 10 
%. In the day two after the + or – 10% return there  doesn´t occur that kind of 
reversal in returns except in the third day of the winner portfolio, where the 
return is almost as big as in the day 1, -0,443 %. 
 
 
Day  Winner % mean Loser % mean 
1 -0,452 1,232 
2 0,138 0,068 
3 -0,443  0,098 
4 -0,094  0,019 
5 0,027 0,278 
Cumulative return 0,024 1,701 
Table 9 The returns of winner and loser portfolios, smoothed data 
 
DAY 
Winner Z-
test 
Loser Z-
test 
Winner 
standard 
deviation 
Loser 
standard 
deviation 
1 1 0,004 2,479 3,127 
2 0,635 0,711 2,525 2,631 
3 0,997 0,554 2,473 2,564 
4 0,616 0,874 2,664 2,358 
5 0,982 0,878 2,133 2,503 
Table 10 Z-test and standard deviation, smoothed portfolios 
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5.5 The daily returns 
 
5.5.1 The first day 
 
In the first day after 10 % change in a stock´s price, a some reverse movements 
can be found  in return patterns. In a winner-figure there are about 60 occasions 
where the return is negative, about 30 neutral and about 40 where return is 
positive after initial return of over 10%. Mean of the a prior winner´s is thus 
negative, -0,544%. In a a prior loser portfolio there are more positive than 
negative returns: mean of the loser´s is 1,258 %. There are more references to the 
side of magnitude effect proposed by Brown and Harlow (1988): five occasions 
reverse 10 % after the initial movement -10% or over.   
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Figure 4 The first day after -10% return 
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Figure 5 The first day after +10% return 
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5.5.2 The second day 
 
In the second day the mean of the groups are 0,313 % for winners and 0,159 % 
for losers. The day before the winners had a negative return, but in the day 2 
the winners have in average a better return than losers. Smoothed returns, 5 
most extreme negative and positive returns rejected giver the result 0,138 % for 
winners and 0,068 % for losers.  
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Figure 6 The second  day after -10% return  
 
 
 
Day 2 +10% return
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Figure 7 The second  day after +10% return  
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5.5.3 The third day 
 
In the third day the mean of the groups are -0,359 % for winners and 0,164 % for 
losers. The day before the winners had a positive return, but in the day 3 the 
losers have in average a better return than winners. Smoothed returns are -0,443 
% for losers and 0,098 % for winners.  
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Figure 8 The third  day after -10% return  
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Figure 9 The third  day after + 10% return 
 
 
 64 
5.5.4.The fourth day 
 
In the fourth day the mean of the groups are 0,049 % (-0,094%)  for winners and 
0,127 % (0,019%)  for losers. The day before the winners had a negative return. 
In the day 4 the losers have in average a better return than winners. 
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Figure 10 The fourth day after -10% return 
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Figure 11 The fourth day after +10% return 
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5.5.5. The fifth day 
 
In the fifth  day the mean of the groups are -0,059  % for winners and -0,021 % 
for losers. The day before the winners had a positive return. Losers have 
negative return of -0,021%. The smoothed returns are 0,027 % for winners and 
0,278% for losers. The losers benefit of rejecting 10 findings -0,021% => 0,278% 
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Figure 12 The fifth day after -10% return 
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Figure 13 The fifth day after +10% return 
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5.6. The study question and the hypotheses 
 
 
Study questions of this thesis are: Is there a directional intensity effect of the 
overreaction hypothesis in the Finnish stock market? Does the efficient market 
hypothesis hold in the Finnish stock market? Can there be a trading strategy 
adapted of the behavior of prices in case of overreaction? 
 
The hypotheses of the thesis  are: 
 
H1: There exists the price reversal as implication of directional effect of  
overreaction hypothesis in case of extreme price movements in the Finnish 
stock market.  
 
H2: If the evidence of the overreaction exists, it is corrected by market in 
subsuquent days as implication of market efficiency hypothesis. 
 
H3: There can be formed a profitable trading patterns based the  price behavior 
of stocks in case of overreaction.  
 
Empirical findings of the study present, that the first hypothesis holds. There 
exists a directional effect of overreaction hypothesis in the Finnish stock market. 
The returns of a portfolio of stocks which have had over -10 percent daily 
return, have return of 1.25  % in the next day. The scale of a average return of a 
stock is roughly 1 % in one month. The returns of a stocks which have had over 
+10 % daily return, have return of -0,54 % in the next day. The empirical finding 
support the second hypothesis, too. The overreaction effect is strongest in the 
first day after the initial return of ± 10 % and disappears during the next four 
days. The third hypothesis is rejected: there exists an overreaction in a prior -
10% loser stocks, but the magnitude of the effect isn´t enough for profitable 
trading activity. There isn´t a clear pattern for a specific day of month of 
occasion to be a prediction of purchases of stocks. The hypotheses summarized 
are: 
 
H1 = > accepted 
H2 = > accepted 
H3 => not accepted. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The basic contradiction between the efficient market hypothesis and the 
overreaction hypothesis is that the efficient market hypothesis presumes a 
contrarian strategy shouldn´t be profitable and there should be no difference 
what kind of returns there has been in the past. Overreaction hypothesis states 
that there should occur a price reversal in a returns of stock in case of a extreme 
price movement: past loser securities become winner securities in the future 
and thus a contrarian strategy should be profitable. 
 
Modern stock markets of different countries  are tested to be efficient by several 
empirical tests,  at least up to a certain level. Variety of anomalies, for example 
occasional over- and underreactions violate against the hypothesis of market 
efficiency, but if they are apparently as common, they aren´t actually a proof of 
inefficiency, but efficiency. Price of a share may deviate from the fundamental 
value of a share, but the efficient market corrects the situation over the time and 
prices will eventually reflect the nearest actual value of a share. 
 
Stock market is efficient most of the time. When is the time, it isn´t efficient? An 
usual illustrator, presented by news and newspapers, of a price development of 
a stock market is the curve, which may have large slopes downwards every 
now and then, but has the basic direction upwards. Falls are often more 
dramatic and short-termed in the stock market than  rises of the prices, which 
happens during a longer period. In both cases, the price of the stock in 
exchange and the fundamental price of a stock, counted by researcher through a 
sophisticated formula  may deviate from eachothers.  
 
One explanation for the stock market fluctuation is given by Stephen McClellan 
(2007) who claims, that a constant growth in security prices is good for banks 
and other intermediaries of a financial branch. He states that customers of 
investment advisors and banks are encouraged to make investment decisions 
for a short period of time, even if it is proofed, that investments should be done 
for a longer periods. Banks, advisors and other intermediaries of the branch,  
get their income of trading fees and commisions. Thus their analyses are not 
even meant to predict the development of returns but to motivate people to 
trade actively. The quality of analyses for the investors is not good. Like the title 
of the work says, the proposed trading strategy is momentum strategy: the right 
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way to act in the financial market is to do like the market does and its most 
powerful actors do: sell if they are selling and buy when they are buying. Today 
there are registers where the ownership of the companies can be checked.  
 
Even if there are a advanced technical capabilities to trade stocks nowadays, 
people behind the technique implement the headlines for investment decisions. 
The behavior of a man has been studied for a long. It has been found that the 
financial-decision making is often based on biased and systematic false 
manners. People tend to keep losing investments too long and selling winning 
investments too soon. Decisions are made by heuristic methods, which are 
rather pleasant than optimal. Decision makers have too much confidence on 
their ability to find out the best solutions in the stock market. The positive 
information received from the advisors, who seldom tell investor to sell, leads 
eventually to the herd behavior where prices potentially have great deviations 
from their fundamental values. When there is the good sentiment in the market, 
the deviation is at its highest.  
 
A bad sentiment there was  in the Helsinki Stock Exchange in September 1992, 
when the index of the exchange landed in 541 points, the all time –low quote. 
The other extreme there were in March 2000, when it ended to 18277 points. 
Difference between these all time-high and all time-low closings are over 3300 
percent. Could this happen again? The reason for this is actually the  
development of a single company in narrow market in Finland, and of course, 
the comparison is done between two extreme notions, but could the 
momemtum lead the stock market to the situation, where the (OM)HEX-index 
would be 33-times more than today? It is easy to imagine, that the stock prices 
can be noted sky high, there are examples of the phenomenon in the near 
history: bubble around the year 2000 will not be forgotten and new bubbles are 
to be blown, in some scale at least. More difficult it is to see, that companies 
could develop their actions so in the future, that their profitability of a 
production would be 33-times more than today, in the competed market. The 
thing remains to be seen, in the short-term people the things are overestimated, 
but in the long-term underestimated.   
 
The empirical part of this study shows, that the price behavior of stocks of the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange has been relatively moderate during the last six years. 
There exists movements of over ± 10 percent in average 3 – 4 times per month, 
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but if there have been years, where the occasions have been multiple. 
Constituting a trading strategy based on the contrarian strategy is difficult even 
if there would exist a short-term overreactin in the Finnish stock market.  
 
In the concept of market efficiency the question and the interest isn´t the intrical 
and fundamental value of a stock. The general agreement of the correct prices 
of stocks  among buyers and sellers is the implications for the market efficiency. 
This kind of concensus is formed daily between participants of market: one 
wouldn´t buy the stock if he thinks it is overvalued and the other wouldn´t sell 
if he thinks the stock is undervalued.  
 
The style of a trading strategy, based on the findings presented in this thesis, 
would be a one where the object of purchase, stock,  is selected by means of a 
fundamental analysis and the time of purchase is selected by means of 
behavioral finance and technical analysis.  
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